| Pursuit/Overtake is there a real difference? Home | |
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| The Florida Highway Patrol prides itself on being a progressive agency. They are especially proud of their Pursuit Policy and hold it up as example to other agencies in Florida and nationwide. When adopted in 1996 it was certainly a needed step in the right direction. The days of chasing all violators, regardless of the dangers involved, were over-The FHP would only chase for crimes of violence: | |
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| Since 1996 most progressive policies more
tightly define the types of crimes officers can pursue for as well as addressing a list of
external factors (weather, traffic etc.) that affect the pursue/no pursue decision. I
refer the reader to the Orange
County Sheriff’s Office policy or the Orlando Florida Police Department policy
for examples of more modern progressive policies. The recent case of the death of Trooper Darryl Haywood has exposed very serious problems with the FHP Pursuit Policy as well as serious public safety issues in the implementation of that policy. Since 1996 the FHP only pursues for crimes of violence, but they do Overtake for traffic violations. Overtake as defined by the FHP Pursuit Policy: |
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| Since the most common traffic violation is
speeding, overtaking the suspect vehicle will require that a trooper exceed the speed
limit. The faster the suspect is travelling-the faster the trooper must go to overtake him
and the speeds required ratchet to what can only be classified as dangerous. . |
Suspect |
Separation |
Overtake Time (minutes) |
The overtake speed (maroon field) does not include the acceleration time of the trooper nor the time it takes the trooper to slow and cross the median if the trooper observes the suspect from the opposite lane of travel. Suspect speeds are intended to represent a reasonable range of speeds on limited access highways. Example: If the suspect is travelling 90 mph it would require an overtake speed of 110 mph to close a 1 mile separation in 3 minutes and would cover 4.5 miles. (1.5 mpm x 3 minutes) |
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3 |
5 |
10 |
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80 |
0.5 |
90 |
86 |
83 |
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1.3 miles |
1 |
100 |
92 |
86 |
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per minute |
1.5 |
110 |
98 |
89 |
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85 |
0.5 |
95 |
91 |
88 |
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1.4 miles |
1 |
105 |
97 |
91 |
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per minute |
1.5 |
115 |
103 |
94 |
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90 |
0.5 |
100 |
96 |
93 |
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1.5 miles |
1 |
110 |
102 |
96 |
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per minute |
1.5 |
120 |
108 |
99 |
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100 |
0.5 |
110 |
106 |
103 |
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1.6 miles |
1 |
120 |
112 |
106 |
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per minute |
1.5 |
130 |
118 |
109 |
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110 |
0.5 |
120 |
116 |
113 |
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1.8 miles |
1 |
130 |
122 |
116 |
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per minute |
1.5 |
140 |
128 |
119 | ||
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| The danger involved to the trooper as well as highway traffic at
the overtake speeds and distances demonstrated in the table above should be self evident.
One of the key factors leading to many agencies restricting pursuits is the speed of the
participants and its duration. It is incontrovertible that the faster a police officer
travels the more likely that he will lose control of his vehicle and the more serious the
resulting consequences will be, irregardless of whether the officer is pursuing or
overtaking. As speeds increase so do the demands on the reaction times, driving skills,
physiology and equipment of the officer. Pursuits and Overtakes, as defined in FHP policy, differ in only one respect; the suspect is not aware of the troopers attempt to stop him in an overtake. When a trooper overtakes a traffic violator there are only 2 possible outcomes once the violator becomes aware of the trooper: |
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| In the first outcome the FHP policy has
decided that the demonstrated dangers of the overtake were an acceptable risk in order to
write a traffic citation. What is an acceptable number of crashes, injuries or deaths per
100 traffic citations? Per 1,000 citations? In the second outcome the trooper is compelled to discontinue since FHP prohibits pursuits for any crime except crimes of violence. In this scenario the net gain is zero for the risks accepted in the overtake. Some have argued that the overtake allows the trooper to slip up on the violator and obtain a license number in case the violator flees. No one would argue that the overwhelming majority of motorists yield to law enforcement officers. Similarly, it would be difficult to argue that any motorist who would flee would be unaware enough of the presence of a trooper to allow him to get close enough to get a license number. It is clear that the dangers of an overtake are less than the dangers of a full blown pursuit most of the time. The exception would be if the violator is already driving dangerously as the trooper is attempting to overtake him. Still it is hard to understand a policy that has made a value judgement on what crimes warrant the risks of pursuits and then gives troopers unlimited discretion when it comes to overtakes. For an overtake to become a pursuit the trooper must perceive that the suspect is evidencing an awareness of the trooper by his actions. Herein lies a serious problem in the FHP policy. At a time where all police officers are experiencing a surge in adrenaline, tunnel vision, increased heart rate and a perceived challenge from the suspect we ask that the trooper make the subtle distinction between between an overtake and pursuit. Further, we open the door for institutional abuse of the policy where supervisors or investigators readily accept an explanation of "the suspect never knew I was there," or immediately classify incidents as overtakes at the onset. Additionally, the stage is set to hide individual abuse of policy or bad pursuit decision making. At the very least, the citizens of Florida have been forced to accept a policy that carries a significant risk of injury or death-without any measurable benefit. All of the foregoing conclusions assume that FHP policy and practice, requires the activation of emergency lights or sirens when overtaking or pursuing a suspect at speeds above the speed limit. I await a requested official declaration from the FHP on exactly what the policy on this issue is. Obviously this practice would greatly increase the danger to uninvolved motorists and I will address this issue when I am advised of precise policy of FHP. James Phillips October 12, 2004 , |
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©2004 PursuitWatch All Rights Reserved |
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